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in Kierkegaard
by VINCENT A. McCARTHY
In Kierkegaard's religious psychology, four moods predominate in the analysis 
of the human heart seeking peace and of the spirit seeking fulfillment in a 
restored God-relationship. Our concern here will be to discuss facets of one 
of those moods, viz. melancholy (the others being irony, anxiety, and despair). 
Of the four moods, one notes that melancholy is the sole in Kierkegaard's 
authorship which does not have a treatise explicitly devoted to it. There are 
The Concept of Irony, The Concept of Anxiety (Dread), and The Sickness 
Unto Death to deal with irony, anxiety, and despair respectively. But there 
exists no formal treatise on melancholy. However, melancholy is a major theme 
and category throughout most of what may be termed Kierkegaard’s earlier 
authorship in which he engages aesthetic categories. The later pseudonym 
Johannes Climacus states that the first part of Either ¡Or has melancholy 
[Tungsind\ as its essential character.1 On the basis of this, one might make an 
analysis of EitherfOr’s treatment of melancholy and possibly even reach the 
conclusion that indeed this is the “missing treatise".2
To do that in these pages, however, would be too lengthy a task. But since 
Kierkegaard tends to reorchestrate and develop themes in later works, in the 
instance of melancholy as well we shall be able to locate a restatement and even 
clearer analysis of the two types of melancholy with which we here propose to 
concern ourselves. Two types of melancholy! Yes, that is the point we intend 
to argue Kierkegaard makes very clearly in Repetition (1843) and Stages On 
Life’s Way (1845), particularly in “Guilty?/Not Guilty?” in this latter. The 
two types of melancholy, which for lack of adequate translation we leave in 
their Danish forms Melancholi and Tungsind, also appear in Either ¡Or? But 
there the analysis is more complicated, and a disentengling of the two terms 
requires structural as well as contextual analysis of the work. In Repetition 
and Stages, there is no danger of confusion. For the former employs the term
Melancholi and the latter the term Tungsind almost exclusively. What clearer 
ground then to explore similarities and differences. In these works there is not 
the temptation to think that Kierkegaard was merely alternating between the 
two possibilities of expression which the Danish language provides. Indeed he 
loved his language and excels all others in its use, but he allows its richness of 
vocabulary to express fine distinctions of ideas -  a fact which the Lowrie 
translations of Kierkegaard, for all their merits, sometimes fail to convey. 
German is more fortunate than English in having two terms as well, Melan­
cholie and Schwermut, to correspond to the Danish. In English, as in French, 
we have the single term “melancholy” and unfortunately this is all the present 
translations of Kierkegaard give us.
The autobiographical content of so many of Kierkegaard’s works, and 
especially the works with which we shall be here concerned, is too obvious to 
ignore. Kierkegaard was himself a melancholy man and knew this mood 
intimately, as he did the others. Moreover, his father also suffered from this 
malady. Kierkegaard even adds that melancholy is the problem of the age.4 
In saying this, however, he speaks of his own age and historical context and in 
this instance is not the contemporary he seems to us in The Present Age. For 
Kierkegaard’s times were those of the early Romantics. Melancholy, and irony 
as well, were important categories for the Romantic poets. And it is the excesses 
of the Romantics, or aesthetes, which he so roundly criticizes. In the analysis of 
both melancholy and irony, Kierkegaard affirms that the Romantics represent 
a spiritual rejuvenation, but that in their enthusiasm they give the stuffy and 
stultified human spirit (represented by Classicism) too strong a youth potion 
and take it not back to spiritual youth but rather to spiritual infancy. Serving 
here too as a corrective, Kierkegaard hoped to affirm the significance of melan­
choly and irony but to give a more probing analysis of them, by way of 
providing a greater perspective for understanding the movement underway 
within the human spirit. Thus the religious, and eventually the Christian reli­
gious, provides the perspective for understanding the meaning of the turbulence 
in the human spirit and the sole direction in which this turbulence is to be 
channelled by the will in order for a resolution to come about.
In the case of melancholy then, Kierkegaard sees a Romantic and a religious 
type. Melancholi is essentially the melancholy of the Romantics, of poets, and 
of young men. Tungsind is fundamentally the same longing, sensitivity and 
suffering, but a higher level. It is reflective, even brooding, and reaching a crisis
point demanding resolution. And none of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms hesitates 
to add that the sole solution lies in the religious.
Kierkegaard himself knew both Melancholi and Tungsind. The story of 
Repetition and of Quidam’s Diary in “Guilty?/Not Guilty?” clearly parallels 
in part Kierkegaard’s own engagement to Regine Olsen and may indeed contain 
the secret, strange reason which terminated the affair. But that is not the point 
of our examination here. We mention it only by way of emphasizing it as a 
danger into which all too many have fallen, viz. of treating the early works 
more for their autobiographical content about an admittedly fascinating 
Romantic character himself than for the ideas and analyses contained therein. 
Yes, Kierkegaard was melancholy and reserved, and perhaps in part he wanted 
his authorship to communicate his true feelings and sufferings. But whatever 
his hopes of regaining Regine Olsen and whatever moral scruples he let torment 
him for a broken engagement, he emphatically intended his works to go beyond 
his own personal circumstances to more decisive issues. Events in his own life 
provide the inspiration for many of the works, but Kierkegaard always moves 
away from the personal level to suggest the universal individual situation. This 
is the challenge of his analyses which the victims of biographical distraction 
have apparently missed.
The Terms MELANCHOLI and T U N G S I N D .
Scrutinizing terms is highly appropriate in the case of so self-conscious a stylist 
as Kierkegaard. He begins with normal usage but like so many philosophers 
he often makes unmistakable departures from that usage by adding new 
meaning. This is certainly the case with the terms for melancholy. In Danish, 
the two terms are not identical but yet are often used interchangeably in 
colloquial speech. Yet if one tries to pindown the meaning of each term, one 
can at minimum find native speakers in agreement that there is after all some 
difference between them and, furthermore, that Tungsind represents a higher 
degree of the same basic mood. This then is the base Kierkegaard builds on 
and expands.
In addition, Kierkegaard also plays upon the images contained in the terms. 
Melancholi is of course the same opaque term from medieval medicine which 
we have also in English and which literally means “black bile”. Tungsind 
however is a transparent term in Danish. It means literally “heavy mind” or
“heavy spirit” (Tung-smd). Were we to attempt to fashion a new term in 
English to correspond to it, we would perhaps suggest “heavy spiritedness”. But 
rather than succumb to a clumsy neologism, we here propose to maintain the 
Danish terms in our discussion. As an adjective, the form tungsindig means not 
only “melancholy” or “melancholic” but also “gloomy” and “brooding”. In each 
term, Kierkegaard is conscious of the image and plays upon it, viz. blackness 
and heaviness respectively. (This is most clearly done in Either ¡Or in the 
instance of Melancholi.)
May not some critic at this point object that we have become overly sensitive 
to language and that Kierkegaard himself was merly using the stylistic alter­
nation provided by Danish? The reply to this has two parts. The first is a 
simple rule-of-thumb. That is, when there are in Danish both a Danish- 
root word and a foreign loan word for the same general concept, in Kierke­
gaard’s usage the Danish-root word often acquires a special meaning. This is 
brought out by Lowrie’s translation of Existents and Tilværelse in the Postscript, 
for example, and not to make the distinction would hopelessly confuse the 
work. Having invoked the rule-of-thumb, we shall now set out to prove its 
validity in the case of Melancholi and Tungsind. We therefore propose, in the 
second part of our reply to the possible criticism, to demonstrate the clear 
differences between the two terms in Repetition and “Guilty?/Not Guilty?”.
REPETITION and “Guilty?¡Not Guilty?”.
Repetition and “Guilty?/Not Guilty?” are parallel writings and self-consciously 
so. Moreover, their similarities serve to create a backdrop which highlights 
their differences.
Both works are pseudonymous, but more than that. In each work the 
pseudonym at first claims that the love story to be told is that of another, of 
a young man in Repetition and of Quidam in “Guilty?/Not Guilty?”. But at 
the end of each work the pseudonym acknowledges that the fiancé of each 
work is but a poetical creation of the respective author.
Both works deal with the melancholy of a young man engaged to a younger 
woman. And both are concerned with the surprising phenomenon that melan­
choly endures in spite of the fact that each man is truly in love and that indeed 
melancholy seems only to be aggravated by the love. Quite deliberately each
pseudonym contrasts the phenomenon of an enduring and increasing melan­
choly to the dictum that falling in love will cure a young man’s melancholy. 
And in contradicting the dictum each poses the more important question of 
the real nature of melancholy.
Both works entertain the moral scruple of possible guilt towards the young 
woman in the termination of each relationship. In Repetition, this question is 
raised toward the end of the work. In “Guilty?/Not Guilty?”, where the theme 
of the moralistic self-tormentor is explicit, the question is engaged throughout. 
But the question of guilt is extended further to asking whether such a melan­
choly man did not take on guilt in forming such a relationship to begin with, 
thus suggesting that not only does love not cure melancholy but that a 
melancholy man either transcends human love by force of melancholy or else 
must solve the problem of melancholy before being able to commit himself 
to the ethical responsibilities of married love. Kierkegaard’s own conduct and 
that of the characters here would suggest the former possibility, while the 
character of Judge William in Part Two of Either ¡Or suggests the latter also 
as a genuine possibility.
Both works posit a religious element involved in the suffering longing of 
melancholy and suggest that this religious element takes the young lover in 
fact beyond the beloved. In Repetition, we are confronted with a young man 
who has moved beyond his beloved due to his melancholy but is only gradually 
becoming conscious of the fact. In “Guilty ?/Not Guilty?”, we have a man who 
has consciously transcended her and who knows why, and even tries to awaken 
her religious nature in one last desperate effort at saving the engagement, as if 
she too might somehow transcend and join him at some new level. But because 
she does not and perhaps cannot, the solitary nature of the individual’s religious 
life is underscored the more.
The parallels and similarities are many, but here they end. For while both 
deal with the problem of melancholy, each deals with a decisively different 
phase of it. In Repetition, the religious is awakening, according to the analysis 
of the pseudonym Constantine Constantius, and while eventually the young 
man is drifting towards Tungsind, his problem in the main is Melancholi. 
“Guilty?/Not Guilty?” deals with an advanced case of melancholy, termed 
constantly Tungsind, in which the reflective, self-conscious character and 
religious element are explicit in the character and text from the very beginning.
In turning now to consider each of the works individually, we will consider
the story of each and the character of each lover, and in the process discern 
the significance of using a different term for the melancholy discussed in each.
Melancholy in REPETITION.
In Repetition, Constantine Constantius describes the love problems of a 
melancholy young man who is at the age “when maturity of spirit announces 
itself.”5 He has quite suddenly and recently fallen in love and become engaged. 
Visibly transformed, he comes to tell his friend Constantine who finds him 
a beauty to behold. In the past they have had long discussions, in which the older 
Constantine's psychological penchant has attempted to entice the young man's 
melancholy forth from him. We emphasize at this point that the young man is 
in a state of Melancholi, which is the term used throughout except for the few 
instances which we shall note. When the young man returns one day in a 
terrible state, Constantine is taken aback, at first does not understand and is 
set to wondering about his past conceptions of melancholy. For he remarks, 
“Such a melancholy [Melancholi] has never before presented itself in my 
practice.”6
The young man is suffering in a Melancholi which has apparently only be­
come greater by this love.7 Although this is a new phenomenon for Constantine, 
he nevertheless quickly musters the detachment and acumen n> see that this 
melancholy is going to grow into Tungsind, that by this melancholy [tung­
sindig] longing the young man will eventually forsake his beloved, for by it 
he has already leapt across to the end of love.8 Constantine adds that eventually 
this will all lead to a terrible explosion. (An explosion does occur in “Guilty?/ 
Not Guilty?” when another young lover probes himself and his relationship 
further.)
Constantine's commentary is the key to understanding this curious love 
affair and the key too to discovering the meaning of the Melancholi which is 
responsible for the apparent impossibility of the engagement’s continuation. 
Constantine regards the young man first of all as a very sensitive being. His 
sensitivity is what makes him feel the suffering pangs of melancholy to begin 
with. He is, we will recall, at the age when maturity of spirit is announcing 
itself, and in this love for a young girl the “Idea” is stirring.9 Constantine sees 
that the young girl is not the true object of his yearning, that she is not the ideal 
but rather the muse which unconsciously and inadvertently leads him toward
the ideal.10 Eventually he will see, as Constantine does, that the young girl was 
“only the visible semblance whereas his thought, his soul was seeking something 
else which he transferred figuratively to her.”11 Constantine also says, “The 
young girl was not his love, she was the occasion of awakening the primitive 
poetic talent in him and making him a poet.”12 In doing such, she signed the 
death warrant of their love, for the young man has now transcended it and 
can be satisfied with nothing less than the ideal as his object of longing.
At this point, Constantine briefly shifts terminology and refers to Tungsind 
in order to signal melancholy at a higher level, becoming aware of its longing 
for the ideal and entering too into a more critical phase. But because this phase 
is only just beginning, and because the young man is not yet at all conscious 
of it, the term Melancholi returns and is used for the remainder of the work.13 
For considered from the outside and in its completeness, the young man’s 
melancholy is indeed the serious, reflective melancholy which will only be 
satisfied with the religious and as such is Tungsind. But until a greater 
consciousness of the religious arises, it is still Melancholi.
Constantine sees that the movement in the young man is religious in nature 
and withdraws at the limits of his competence.14 For, considered in terms of 
Kierkegaard’s “stages”, Constantine is an ironist and thus in the aesthetic stage 
and incapable as yet of fully understanding the religious which he can yet 
perceive.
The young man never makes the full transition in this work into Tungsind. 
In fact, the story ends very abruptly as he discovers the young girl’s sudden 
marriage to another.15 This is patently autobiographical in origin and reveals 
Kierkegaard’s own astonishment, in the course of penning the work, to discover 
Regine Olsen engaged to Schlegel. It signals too the underscoring of the futility 
of seeking “repetition” in any external sense, as Constantine himself also 
discovered on his return visit to Berlin. Repetition is to be effectively sought 
only in an internal sense, in the pristine reintegration of the self. Here the 
meaning of melancholy is tied to the riddle of the meaning of the new category 
repetition. For both are essentially religious in meaning.
In his concluding letter to the reader, Constantine rightly remarks that “even 
where all ends in melancholy [Melancholi], there is a hint about him, about 
his condition.”16 Constantine has in fact given more than a hint. He states quite 
openly that the young man has a religious sentiment that he (the young man) 
is unable to understand,17 and Constantine foresees this mounting into a crisis
of Tungsind. We, along with Constantine, leave the young man in his 
Melancholi which is already advanced beyond the pained sensitivity and passive 
sufferings of the poets because of the religious element beginning to break 
through. The young man has initially confused his longing for an ideal object, 
about which he becomes gradually conscious, with the love object at hand, 
viz. the young girl. And she serves to awaken and make more conscious the 
higher longing for the ideal which is at the root of the problem Melancholi- 
Tungsind and which he is in the middle of, although he does not know it.
Melancholy in “GuiltyPjNot Guilty?”
As we have already indicated, the similarities between Repetition and “Guilty?/ 
Not Guilty?” are numerous. No one is more aware of this than Frater 
Taciturnus, the pseudonymous author of the latter.18 In Repetition, he notes, 
love makes the young man a poet. The lover in his own work is not a poet 
but is “demoniac in a religious direction” and conscious of the religious ele­
ment.19 Taciturnus remarks explicitly, “The reader who is acquainted with the 
little book of Constantius will perceive that I resemble in a way that author 
but yet am very different.”20 The essential difference, as we have already 
suggested, lies in the meaning of Tungsind and the intensification it represents 
of Melancholi. For what Frater Taciturnus adds to the story of an unhappy 
engagement is a different degree of melancholy which may be justly termed 
“religious melancholy”.
The story of the tragic love in “Guilty?/Not Guilty?” takes the form of a 
diary by the poetical creation Quidam and a commentary by Frater Taciturnus. 
The diary consists of morning entries which trace the events of “a year ago” 
and chronicle the disintegration of the engagement, much as if it were a memoir 
in approximately daily installments. Alternating with the morning entries are a 
series of midnight entries which refer to the aftermath of the broken engage­
ment and the problem of guilt which continues to haunt Quidam.
On the first page of his memoir, Quidam tells us that “Melancholy [Tung­
sind] is my very nature.”21 Yet, twelve days after falling in love at first sight 
with a young woman, he becomes engaged, in the false hope of being trans­
formed and saved, only now to muse “And are there not as it were two natures 
striving within me?”22 A year later he sees more clearly than ever that the 
second nature is the religious nature and that is was “the eternal, a God-
relationship, relationship to ideals” which moved his soul.23 He becomes aware 
that the woman does not share his sensitivity for the religious, while he himself 
is overwhelmed by it.24 He is perhaps even obsessed with the religious and with 
setting it in motion in her. But he is not yet a religious individual himself. “I am 
not actually a religious individual, I am only a properly and completely formed 
possibility of such a thing,”25 he writes a year later in his midnight commentary, 
thus indicating that, while he is clearly aware of the religious and even of the 
religious base of his Tungsind, he has not yet reached a resolution. In 
pushing her toward the religious unwisely, he brings forth the explosion which 
Constantine predicted for the young man of Repetition,28 His Tungsind is 
momentarily wafted away and he sees her not as any longer an ideal figure 
but rather as “a saucy little miss.”27 At this point, a rupture is unavoidable. 
The religious, which he recognizes to be connected integrally with the crisis 
of his intensifying Tungsind, now makes a marriage impossible. The engage­
ment is broken, both parties are plunged into suffering and his entire life-view 
collapses.28 This is a decisive development in terms of the three stages of 
existence in Kierkegaard’s thought. (And of course the diary is found in the 
larger work entitled Stages On Life’s Way.) The aesthetic is shattered, for this 
is what his former life-view amounted to. At the same time, he finds himself 
thrust beyond the ethical. For he finds himself in the ethical problems of duty 
toward the young girl and the implicit duty of every ethical man to reveal 
himself in the (ethical) state of marriage, yet at the same time is placed in 
conflict with his apparent ethical duty by virtue of a higher commitment, viz. 
the religious (which is also the central issue in Fear and Trembling). He cannot 
reveal himself; he is closed-in (indesluttet) because of the Tungsind which is 
not resolved. And he feels projected towards the religious in a way which for 
him transcends the normal course of marriage. “I was melancholy [tungsindig\ 
. . .  I required an ideality under the weight of which I sank,” and he continues, 
“Only religiously can I now understand myself before God.”30 For only the 
religious will now make sense of himself. The aesthetic has not, for it has 
collapsed. The ethical does not seem to be able to, for ethically he is caught up 
in the problem of guilt. He is in a crisis which for him can only be resolved 
religiously. It is not a melancholy which can be cured by falling in love, but 
rather one which has been aggravated and brought to a religious crisis by such 
a love.
Towards the end of his memoir he remarks, “Yes, it is true, a melancholy 
man is in a certain sense mad, but it requires a great deal of dialectic and a 
great deal of pathos to comprehend this madness.”31 It is in fact a divine mad­
ness. Quidam’s Tungsind is individual, even unique, but its religious ground is 
not. Taciturnus, in his commentary, remarks that there is a form of Tungsind 
which poets experience. This is different from the Melancholi normally 
associated with poets and Romantics, for it is a melancholy gone into a crisis 
phase and become self-conscious. But Taciturnus distinguishes between the crisis 
which may come about by warmed-up sufferings merely brooded over and 
the suffering of a crisis which may swiftly find positive resolution in the 
religious. Such melancholy is Quidam’s.32
Taciturnus writes, “So the melancholy [Tungsind] of this lay figure of mine 
is a crisis anticipatory of the religious experience.”33 It is sensitivity become 
sensitivity to the religious, and it is longing which has transcended any human 
substitutes and requires the religious, the eternal. As such, Tungsind does not 
represent the religious but is rather a starting-point for the religious.34
As we have seen, Taciturnus creates Quidam to be different from Constan­
tine’s young man. While both are immersed in problems of melancholy which 
they do not overcome in the course of each respective narrative, there is a 
fundamental difference of degree between each. The young man’s Melancholi, 
Constantine predicts, will become Tungsind as the religious element present 
in it and in him becomes clearer to him. For the moment, he suffers at the poet’s 
level. But Quidam’s religious nature and religious possibility are clear to him 
even before his engagement. His engagement and its rupture only intensify 
the critical aspect of his Tungsind as they deprive him of any illusory alternative 
solutions either in aesthetic or ethical categories. For his aesthetic life-view has 
collapsed, and ethically his situation torments him with a problem of guilt 
which he cannot resolve in ethical terms. His mad situation, which transcends 
the ethical, demands the higher solution of the religious which he already knows 
has been at the base of his Tungsind.
Having considered two works which speak of two distinct phases of 
melancholy, we here turn now to attempt to schematize what the texts present. 
We propose to move from the analyses of the melancholy of two aesthetic 
characters to formulate the missing “concept of melancholy” which is never 
explicit in Kierkegaard’s authorship but is implicit throughout.
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The Concept of Melancholy.
In all the analyses of melancholy which Kierkegaard makes (among which we 
have considered but two), melancholy always emerges as a “given”: it is already 
there in the personality and is now to be accounted for. No state is entirely 
without melancholy, from the dullest aesthete who only faintly senses it to the 
religious man who still senses it faintly (as Judge William remarks in Eitherj 
Or). This Melancholi is the innocent throb of suffering longing within a 
sensitive nature and it indicates both sensitivity and religious potentiality. (It 
remains even in the individual who exists in religious categories for so long 
as he lives he has always greater religious potential.) Melancholi indicates a 
personality already impregnated with the eternal, with a spiritual dimension. 
But in its initial phases, it indicates a gestating, “unborn” religious nature. In 
the language so frequent in the authorship, spirit sleeps. However, it will 
awake. And the first awakening, which we witness in Repetition for example, 
comes about as the result of a natural dynamism of spiritual growth within the 
evolving personality. The beginning of the evolutionary movement is referred 
to as the stirring of spirit, or the stirring of the Idea. The image of stirring is 
important, for it speaks of an agitation by laws of inner necessity within the 
depths of the person. The agitation seeks a resolution -  something which comes 
about gradually through transformation of the personality.
As the stirring increases, a conflict emerges between one’s way of life (which 
is aesthetic) and the hidden essence of the movement. For the given, posited 
way of life is the “natural” state beyond which the dynamism of spirit calls 
one. This natural state is not to be abandoned, but rather modified and trans­
formed.
The stirring within the personality reveals that an encounter with the Ab­
solute is sought, with the grounding and transforming Power. The longing for 
the Absolute, the Ideal, the eternal, might even be spoken of as a “metaphysical 
wound”. For it seeks its healing, and ultimately can only find it, in religious 
experience in which the Absolute is encountered. It is a wound which festers 
so long as it is not healed, and a wound which is never entirely healed (thus 
the enduring melancholy in the religious man).
But the demand for the Absolute does not reveal in itself where such an 
encounter can take place. Repetition teaches, in its riddles, that the search for
an external solution, in frantic activity, in love, or even in intellectual endeavors 
results in only so much frustration and even worsening of ones pained longing. 
The key lies in understanding the kind of emotion melancholy is. For 
melancholy is a reflexive emotion. Emotions are generally directed outwards, 
toward some object (as in love, hate, etc.). But melancholy has no object, in 
two senses. First, it has no object because the Absolute is an impossible object 
for human longing (understood in the external sense). Second, it has no object 
because the “object” which is ultimately the solution is the Self grounded in 
a relationship to the Absolute which is its Constituting Power (cf. Sickness 
Unto Death). Properly speaking, the Self is not an object for oneself. 
Melancholy is an emotion which is “about” the Self and which seeks the 
incorporation of the life of the Absolute into the personality which already 
participates nascently in it.
While there is no clear line of demarcation between the two degrees of 
melancholy, Tungsind indicates that the state of melancholy is taking on new 
seriousness and urgency. Tungsind is a natural development of the state of 
melancholy, as spirit begins to stir actively. A new degree of reflection enters 
in, and one begins to perceive that one's failure to resolve the problem of 
melancholy, by moving in the direction in which it prompts, is finally 
responsible for the aggravation of the “wound”. Guilt and brooding arise as 
natural consequences of passive continuation in the mood.
The heaviness of melancholy, of which the image in Tungsind (“heavy 
spirit”) speaks, is constituted by the “burden of the self” which is felt more 
and more. The refusal to will the transformation of the Self into religious 
categories is the refusal to lift the weight (and to allow Grace to remove the 
burden finally). By process of elimination, one comes to see in melancholy 
that the sole resolution lies in the internal, in following the religious which 
one senses, in taking on the task of becoming a centered person by allowing 
and affirming the centripetal movement underway.
“Despair” as the affirmation of the Self in ethico-religious categories is the 
first decisive step to be taken by the will in overcoming despair. For this alone 
prepares the way for attaining the birth of the eternal in the personality and 
thus a union with the Ideal, the Absolute, such as one desires. (The Ideal, the 
Absolute and the eternal are, for Kierkegaard of course, synonyms of God.) 
Full resolution of melancholy comes about only by moving completely through
despair and the limits of the human to the point of recognizing the need for 
Gods forgiving Grace in order for a full restoration of the Self (in “repetition”) 
to come about and for the longing for union to be consummated.
However, Kierkegaard’s aesthetic writings trace the consequences of the 
non-resolution of melancholy in an exploration of the eccentric characters who 
resist the centripetal movement. Non-resolution brings about the enfeeblement 
of the will which refuses to will. The refusal to move toward a cohesion of 
the personality leaves one in a state of fragmentation in which the mis- 
channeling of the energy of spiritual transformation wreaks havoc within the 
emotional life. As a consequence, one is more and more the victim of moods 
and rides the crests of enthusiasm and despair. One becomes prisoner of oneself, 
locked in upon oneself, closed in {indesluttet) and unable to go out to others. 
These consequences are all vividly portrayed in the young aesthete of Either ¡Or 
and particularly in the “Diapsalmata” as his unwilling self-revelation.
In summary, the essence of melancholy is the longing for a restoration of 
one’s God-relationship. In melancholy, the desire and the need for a religious 
dimension and religious grounding of the Self is experienced in two phases, 
first in the unconscious longing and suffering of Melancholi and then in the 
reflective and discerning longing of Tungsind. Through both phases, the 
individual discovers the shattered religious possibility (cf. Concept of Anxiety 
[Dread]) of the Self and one’s urgent need for an incorporation of the religious 
in order to achieve the peace which the human heart yearns for and the growth 
which a natural spiritual dynamism propels it towards. For those who find in 
this analysis an echo of Augustine’s “Cor nostrum inquietum donee requiescat 
in Te, Domine,” we might add that Kierkegaard would be the first, no doubt, 
to agree. For while the categories and terms of the ages change, the uniquely 
possible “Object” of human longing remains the same.
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